Civil society is the main victim of repression in the autonomous regions of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

The protests that erupted in the autonomous regions of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan almost three years ago ended in bloody repression.

Dozens of people were killed and hundreds were arrested in the turbulent Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region of Tajikistan (GBAO) and the autonomous Republic of Karakalpakstan within Uzbekistan.

However, experts say that the biggest victim of repression is civil society: prominent human rights defenders, journalists, and local opinion leaders have become the main targets of authoritarian regimes in both countries.

"A common feature uniting the crackdowns on demonstrations in Karakalpakstan and GBAO was the coordinated effort to silence the voices of protesters: to suppress civic leaders who voiced local grievances in order to gain even greater control over the governance of these regions," notes Steve Swerdlow, a lecturer at the University of Southern California.

In Tajikistan, as a result of the crackdown on protests in Gorno-Badakhshan over discontent with the authorities in May 2022, at least 16 people were officially reported killed, although journalists from Azattyk confirmed the deaths of 34 people.

In July, Uzbek security forces opened fire with lethal force while suppressing protests against constitutional amendments affecting the status of the Republic of Karakalpakstan. According to data from Tashkent, 21 people were killed.

The Tajik and Uzbek authorities accused many of those who fell victim to the repression of promoting separatism and inciting violence. Human rights groups call these charges politically motivated.

"TOTAL ELIMINATION OF ANY POTENTIAL ACTIVITY"

One of the most prominent figures at the center of the repression in Tajikistan was Ulfathonim Mamadshoeva, a human rights activist and journalist from the Pamiri ethnic minority.

The authorities accused community leaders, who make up the majority of GBAO's population, estimated at 250,000 people, of inciting unrest in the region.

In December, Mamadshoeva was sentenced to 21 years in prison on charges of extremism. Earlier this month, she was transferred from a pretrial detention center to a women's colony to serve her sentence.

Shortly after the arrest of Mamadshoeva and her ex-husband, Kholbash Kholbashov, state television aired footage allegedly showing the couple confessing to assisting in the planning and organization of the protests.

But just a few days earlier, in an interview with correspondents from the Tajik service of RFE/RL in Dushanbe, Mamadshoeva had denied any involvement in the protests.

After the interview ended, unknown individuals attacked the journalists and seized their equipment. The interview was never broadcast.

A source close to Mamadshoeva's case, speaking to Radio Ozodi on condition of anonymity, said that her imprisonment was a punishment for her regular publications about the 2021 killing of a young Pamiri man, Gulbiddin Zieibekov, by Tajik security forces, as well as for her long history of critical journalism.

"This case affected her as a woman and as a mother. She could not remain indifferent," the source said.

Anger over Zieibekov’s death and Dushanbe’s decision to remove local officials triggered the May protests.

The issues in the Gorno-Badakhshan region and the mutual distrust between the local population and the central government date back to the country's 1992–97 civil war.

During the conflict, local leaders such as Mamadshoeva and Kholbashov sided with the United Tajik Opposition (UTO).

This was followed by a peaceful settlement, and Dushanbe’s sometimes fragile control over the mountainous region led to the development of a civic culture with high levels of public engagement—unlike in other parts of Tajikistan, where President Emomali Rahmon has virtually eliminated any formal political opposition.

Emomali Rahmon President of Tajikistan

In Gorno-Badakhshan, so-called informal leaders emerged. Much to Dushanbe’s displeasure, these local leaders hold significant influence within their communities.

Zamira Dildorbekova, an independent expert from London, notes that the region's residents do not perceive civil society as a "counterparty to the government."

Instead, "due to their calls for greater accountability and transparency, the role of civil society and civic activism is largely perceived ... as contributing to development and providing various services to the population where they are insufficient or absent," Dildorbekova explained in a comment to Azattyk.

Many Pamiris are followers of Ismailism, a branch of Shia Islam, while the majority of other Tajiks are Sunni Muslims. The Aga Khan Foundation, established by the Ismaili spiritual leader who resides abroad, has been involved in investment and charitable projects in Gorno-Badakhshan and other parts of Tajikistan.

According to observers, the space for civil society is now shrinking significantly.

After the suppression of the May protests, Tajik security forces pursued, detained, and in some cases killed several prominent informal leaders who were seen as a counterbalance to Dushanbe’s attempts to establish full control over the region.

This was followed by dozens of arrests, including activists who had formed a special committee demanding a fair investigation into Zieibekov's death.

Earlier this month, ahead of the anniversary of the military operation to suppress the protests, five representatives of civil groups in GBAO reported that the government was pressuring them to voluntarily dissolve their organizations.

"It seems that [our] organizations are not wanted by the authorities," a source connected to these groups told Radio Ozodi, speaking on condition of anonymity out of fear of retaliation.

Commenting on the statements from civil society representatives, the press secretary of the GBAO administration stated that only those NGOs that "collaborated with criminal groups in the region" were subject to closure and dismissed suggestions of a broader policy shift.

The representative added that "numerous violations" were found in the charters and registration documents of these organizations.

However, Dildorbekova from the Institute of Ismaili Studies believes that the Tajik government is determined to achieve the "complete elimination of any potential civic activity or any kind of agents, including at an individual level, whom the authorities perceive as a potential threat to the regime at any given time."

VIOLENCE IN KARAKALPAKSTAN AND THE END OF THE "THAW" IN UZBEKISTAN

In Uzbekistan, the authorities also persecuted prominent public figures, including Dauletmurat Tazhimuratov, a Karakalpak lawyer and journalist.

In January, Tazhimuratov was sentenced to 16 years in prison following unprecedented anti-government protests in the autonomous Republic of Karakalpakstan last year. He was accused of attempting to overthrow the local government in order to establish himself as the ruler of Karakalpakstan.

In an interview with Azattyk during Tazhimuratov's appeal hearing last week, his lawyer, Sergey Mayorov, called his client a "political prisoner on whom the authorities have placed the blame for their own mistakes."

The mistake Mayorov referred to was the Uzbek authorities' decision to draft constitutional amendments that would have stripped the region, with a population of two million, of its legal right to hold a referendum on secession from Uzbekistan.

Tazhimuratov and other public figures openly opposed this move, and his arrest appears to have been the trigger for the mass protests in the regional capital, Nukus, on July 1.

Unlike GBAO, Karakalpakstan is an autonomous republic with its own flag and parliament, and the Karakalpak language, which is similar to Kazakh, has official status.

The government rescinded the proposed constitutional amendments after the bloody crackdown on protests, during which security forces opened fire on the crowd.

Despite Karakalpakstan’s special status, the central government maintains strict control over the republic, and the space for civic activity there is perhaps more restricted than anywhere else in Uzbekistan.

During the trial, Tazhimuratov praised President Shavkat Mirziyoyev's efforts at reform since coming to power in 2016. He stated that, thanks to these changes, activists are able to raise and discuss issues.

But many experts say that last year’s violence may mark the end of the so-called thaw in the authoritarian regime.

Tazhimuratov was one of more than 20 defendants convicted in January, while several dozen others received guilty verdicts in March.

"I think it’s fair to say that the key to reforms and freedoms in Uzbekistan lies in what is happening now in Karakalpakstan," says Akylbek Muratov, a Karakalpak activist living in Kazakhstan.

"Because if there is repression in one region but not in another, the existing ethnic tensions will only escalate more rapidly. There will be no stability. Whatever policy Tashkent chooses for Karakalpakstan, we will see its consequences for Uzbekistan as a whole," Muratov adds.

Article Originally Published at Radio Ozodi by Chris Riklton. All rights given to the respected author. This is a copy for desimination purposes only and for gathering data in on place.